The relations between China and Canada are a relatively little understood area. The world continues to fixate on China’s relations with the US, and with the EU. There are multiple centres focusing on both these areas, inside and outside China. But when one looks to getting more detail and analysis of Chinese relations with Canada then the resources start to thin out.

　　This is a strange thing. It was a Canadian, the doctor Norman Bethune, who figured so early in the Chinese Communist Party propaganda literature even before 1949. Mao Zedong wrote a famous essay lauding the contributions that Bethune had made during the 1930s while living in China, and he was one of the very few foreigners with high name recognition in China throughout the post 1949 period. Canada was early to open doors to China, initiating negotiations in the depths of the Cultural Revolution era in 1968 under Pierre Trudeau to formally recognize each other. They established full diplomatic relations two years later, preceding the United States historic breakthrough under Nixon with China by two years.

　　Ironically, it is Pierre Trudeau’s son who now leads Canada, having won a landslide victory against the incumbent as Prime Minister Stephen Halper earlier this year. Halper’s era in office typified the unexpected challenges of Canada China relations, something very different from the halcyon days of the Trudeau era of the 1970s when so many things seemed to be possible. Halper himself was very critical of human rights issues in China, and his officials sponsored a scathing critique of China in the mid 2000s, stating that more needed to be done to pressurize the government in Beijing. Halper himself did not attend the 2008 Olympics opening ceremony. Under his watch, the Dalai Lama was awarded honorary citizenship of Canada. More tangibly, the Lai Changxin case offered a constant impediment to good all round relations.

　　Lai, involved in the vast smuggling scandal in Fujian in the late 1990s, fled China and ended up in Canada in 1999. His return to China was requested by the Chinese government, who wished to put him on trial on charges of corruption and embezzlement. But the Canadian government resisted all such appeals on the grounds that he might be executed on his repatriation. Only after exhaustive appeal processes and assurances from the Chinese government was Lai eventually returned to China, standing trial in 2012 and being given a life sentence.

　　The other complicating factor was the popularity of Canada as a migration destination for Chinese, from the Mainland and Hong Kong. From 1989, many Hong Kong Chinese made Canada one of their favourite destinations, to the extent that cities like Vancouver on the west coast almost resembled in parts Chinese places, with a large number of ethnic Chinese working and living in specific areas. Through the 1990s and 2000s this trend continued, largely because of Canada’s relatively liberal and generous visa and resettlement regulations. Those with the right qualifications were often able to secure permanent residency and eventually citizenship. This very young and new Chinese diaspora in Canada was very diverse, but large enough to be politically significant. The skilled migrant scheme was mostly closed off in 2014, meaning that levels of Chinese coming to Canada to live and settle has started to fall.

　　Halper himself did move from his original, more contrarian position towards China to a more balanced one. He undertook one visit to Beijing in 2009, with a follow up in 2012 which was largely regarded as successful. There were also visits from China to Canada, with Wen Jiabao the then Premier visiting. The focus of these have increasingly turned out to be about trade and economic links. China is, as of 2014, Canada’s second largest trading partner, and ranks as 13th largest for China. It matters because of its plentiful resources, and the fact that it remains a wealthy, middle-sized market for Chinese goods. It is also a place where more Chinese investment has been doing, particularly in the housing and energy sector.

　　Are we about to see a `golden age’ of Chinese Canadian relations in the same way as we have seen such an age pronounced between the UK and China? The odds are slightly higher with the election of Justin Trudeau. He has a few significant advantages in the eyes of the Beijing government. Firstly, there is the simple fact that he is Pierre Trudeau’s son, a western leader who was regarded as being relatively friendly towards China even at a time when it was relatively isolated. Memories of such friendliness do not fade easily in China, even though the leaders of that era have all now died or retired. The diplomatic capital is something that Justin can use.

　　In addition to this, he has the benefit of not being Halper. For all the work Halper did after his initial frostiness towards Beijing, these sorts of memories are hard to wholly eradicate. China was always quite cautious about embracing him as a partner, and even after things were patched up from 2009 it was never a particularly passionate relationship, the tone quite formal and restrained.

　　Thirdly, Justin Trudeau has made promises to energise and improve Canada’s economy. China figures importantly in this. Over the period from 2010, direct investment into Canada from the People’s Republic increased by over USD10 billion. The primary sectors were real estate, mining and resources. But despite this, Chinese FDI still constitutes under 4 per cent of all such direct investment in Canada. There is scope to improve it. Canada also has over 1 million ethnic Chinese. In many studies of Chinese foreign investment, the Chinese diaspora has been an important ennabler, useful as a localized network for Chinese entrepreneurs and companies. So the Canadian ethnic Chinese community figures importantly in the desire for deeper economic and investment engagement between the two.

　　But there remain a number of impediments. In June 2015, a survey showed high levels of disapproval and wariness about Chinese investment. This survey, published by the Asia Pacific Foundation, showed that nearly half those polled regarded Chinese investment as non-jobs creating, environmentally unfriendly, and against Canada’s interests. They were also wary of China’s impact on the resource and energy sector, and felt that its investments here were in its interests, but not necessarily those of Canada.

　　Justin Trudeau and President Xi Jinping met at the G20 summit held in Turkey in mid November and had a largely positive first encounter. With all the other issues crowding up on China in the wider world, it probably wants a straightforward, harmonious relationship with Canada. The challenge for Trudeau is now how to find the right framework what accepts some of the reservations in the wider public about China, but makes it possible to have a more coherent, and stable, policy running into the future, one that does not vary according to the moods of politicians domestically.

　　At the heart of this is the creation of a more consensual vision of what China is, and what sort of opportunity it offers Canada. Canadians are often seen as keen to differentiate themselves from the US, their vast neighbour who, culturally, economically and politically often seems to swamp them. For Trudeau, pursuing a China policy that ends up antagonizing Washington would be unthinkable. But striving to have a policy that keeps closer to Canada’s national interests while not upsetting its other allies would be rational. A clearer idea of what sort of foreign investment it wants from China would be a good place to start.

　　For this, Trudeau will need to aspire to create cross-party support, so that no matter what party is in power in Ottawa, the broad shape of policy towards China is maintained. This is important because of the long term significance of China to Canada, and the need to look beyond a short term time period dictated by electoral cycles and aim for a ten to twenty year vision of where both countries want to end up. Trudeau does have an advantage in the fact that the leadership in Beijing are evidently supportive of this too, and feel value in having such a sustainable relationship with Canada. The main thing now is offering something they can work with.

　　Canada is often very self-effacing in its international profile and its diplomatic voice. In China’s case, this is a pity, because it has the right kind of history, the right sorts of complementarities, and the right links in terms of culture, ethnic Chinese, and economic relations, to form the basis of a very positive, forward looking relationship. Trudeau is a new leader, and one who has set himself an ambitious reform agenda. There are plenty of ways in which reforging relations with China would tie into that agenda. The question now is whether he is willing to expend the political capital to ensure that this happens.

　　Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, London. From 2012 to 2015 he was Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, Australia. Prior to this he worked at Chatham House from 2006 to 2012, as Senior Fellow and then Head of the Asia Programme. From 1998 to 2005 he worked at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as First Secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing.

　　Source: King's College London