The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will celebrate fifty years in existence in 2017. It has proved a perplexing but versatile mixture of different countries with widely diverging political systems, ethnicities and world views. Diversity is its hallmark. But 2016 might mark the year when ASEAN really comes of age, achieving new prominence but also exposing itself to new risks and challenges, largely through the prompting of external partners rather than through any inner compulsion.

　　In mid-February President Obama will accord the ASEAN leaders the same high level protocol and treatment that he conveyed to President Xi Jinping of China in mid-2014, by hosting them at the Sunnyland resort for a summit. The symbolism alone is striking. For a long time, ASEAN simply figured as one of a number of entities in the `alphabet soup’, as it is dismissively called, of Asian organizations. But these days, for economic and geopolitical reasons, ASEAN occupies prime territory, and its 680 million inhabitants really start to matter to the rest of the world.

　　There are two reasons for this new prominence, all of them connected with China. The first is the opportunity of ASEAN figuring as a coherent economic bloc, and participating in a free trade deal. The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) looms large in this space. President Obama wants to make this initiative one of his major legacies. Despite huge challenges in getting through Congress in the US, he is keen to see its current 11 members increase. ASEAN members joining up would be a huge fillip. ASEAN already has a free trade agreement with China, signed some years ago. But it also figures in Chinese thinking about an upgraded Asian free trade zone too, something that Beijing wants to counter against the US led TPP.

　　For economic reasons, therefore, ASEAN members are being wooed. Their support matters. If they drift towards TPP, then China will start to nervously consider something approaching economic containment by the US as being the dominant new regional narrative. It will also have to look at how it works more to exercise influence over ASEAN members. Strikingly, for the China instigated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIB), of the ten ASEAN countries, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Myanmar are so far not members.

　　This links to the second more geopolitical reason for prominence. ASEAN membership includes countries that are in dispute over the South China Sea islands – Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Philippines in particular. So their relationship with China is complex. America is keen to forge more unity amongst this group. Its official line on the disputes is that it takes no position in the relative merits of contesting claims, but it does want to see issues sorted out peacefully and according to consent. Many in China however see a far less benign attitude. They regard the US since the late 2000s of using the area to push back against what is seen as Chinese assertiveness. They see events like the deployment of a destroyer to sail through parts of the territory last November as showing ways in which America is making it clear that it regards this territory as part of its own strategic space.

　　The US is already a close ally of members Philippine and Malaysia. It has created strong diplomatic links in the last decade with Vietnam, and more, recently, Myanmar, despite a history of deep antipathy. All of this means that America has leverage across the ASEAN membership, and every reason now to try to speak more to them collectively. It is likely that the security dimension of ASEAN will figure in the Sunnyland talks – the ways in which they can be appealed to by the US to work more collectively with it, and with each other, to hammer out common positions on how to resolve the South and East China Sea disputes. So far, this sort of unity has been lacking, with each country pursuing their own claims. If the US were able to chorale a more united ASEAN position, and one that would probably be counter-poised to China, this would be diplomatically hugely useful to it. It would offer a major source of potential push back against Chinese regional influence and ambitions.

　　For all the warmth and enthusiasm being shown by the world’s major two powers now, ASEAN also has to deal with a significant downside. It has existed primarily as a very loose coalition of countries seeking pragmatic ways of working with each other, but resisting the sort of potential pooling of sovereignty that is seen in comparable groups like the European Union. The new situation means that for the first time ASEAN members need to speak much more specifically and urgently about security and diplomatic issues. For all the appeal of being closer to the US, they have to balance this with the crucial importance of their links with China. They cannot, and most of them would not want, to alienate their most important regional partner and market. Having constructive relations with China is of immense and long term significance for them. Joining TPP, talking about security links more deeply with the US, will antagonize Beijing and create animosity and distrust which will work against ASEANs collective and individual interests.

　　So the strategy in Sunnylands will be for them perform a balancing act – making sure they find ways to work with the US in their security and economic interests, but in a manner which does not provoke China. For some this will be easy enough. Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia have less reason to clash with China, and historically more harmonious relations with Beijing than Vietnam or the Philippines. The membership will need to have a good quality understanding of each other’s red lines expectations than they might ever have needed before. The level of their communication will need to be excellent for them to avoid either splits within themselves over issues and choices, or missteps with their US and Chinese relations strategy. The days when ASEAN could be a low profile grouping are clearly over. Sunnylands shows how much they now matter. But the pressures on them to perform differently and to play a new role are high. And for ASEAN members, that is very much a mixed blessing.

　　Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, London. From 2012 to 2015 he was Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, Australia. Prior to this he worked at Chatham House from 2006 to 2012, as Senior Fellow and then Head of the Asia Programme. From 1998 to 2005 he worked at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as First Secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing.

　　Source：King's College London