導語：近期，橋水基金創始人瑞·達里奧（Ray Dalio）多次圍繞美國債務問題發出警示，核心落點是「債務供給太多、市場需求未必能順暢承接」，由此可能觸發一系列「非常規」的政策與市場反應。其分析並不止於財政本身，而是把債務周期、國內政治周期與地緣周期並置，試圖解釋「為何舊秩序的慣性正在變弱」。

　　一、達里奧的核心判斷：不只看債務，而是看「三個大循環」疊加

　　達里奧在其關於「國家如何走向債務困境」的框架中，反覆強調理解「總體大周期」的必要性：它由大債務周期驅動，並與國內政治秩序變化的周期、以及改寫世界秩序的地緣周期相互作用。這意味着，他對美國債務的擔憂，表面是財政與利率，底層則是：當內部撕裂與外部競爭同步升溫時，債務融資成本與資本偏好會發生結構性遷移——「能借到錢」與「以什麼代價借到錢」，將變成國家與企業共同的約束條件。

　　二、數據在強化「供需敘事」：赤字路徑與利息成本把融資壓力推向前台

　　從可量化指標看，美國財政的「硬約束」正在更清晰地寫進官方預測。美國國會預算辦公室（CBO）最新《預算與經濟展望（2026—2036）》預計，2026財年聯邦赤字約1.9萬億美元，公共債務（債務占GDP比重）在未來十年繼續上行，並在2036年達到約120%，同時淨利息支出占GDP比重也被預測將進一步抬升 (CBO)。在「利息吞噬財政空間」的情境下，新增發債規模與期限結構安排，將持續影響全球無風險利率的中樞。

　　更直觀的供給側信號來自融資安排：美國財政部在季度融資預估中指出，僅2026年1—3月季度，預計將借入約5740億美元的「淨可交易債務」（privately-held net marketable debt） (U.S. Department of the Treasury)。當供給長期偏高、而部分買方（如央行資產負債表收縮、海外資金風險偏好變化）趨於謹慎時，達里奧所說的「供需失衡」就不再只是觀點，而是一條可被持續跟蹤的鏈條。

　　達里奧本人在公開訪談中也把矛盾聚焦於此：美國需要出售大量國債，但市場是否願意以既有價格與利率水平承接，存在不確定性；若失衡加劇，可能出現「令人震驚的應對方式/結果」的擔憂 (Reuters)。

　　三、「去美元化」更像邊際再配置：美元仍占主導，但多元化在發生

　　討論債務供需，繞不開「美元資產是否仍被無條件吸收」。從儲備貨幣結構看，美元地位並未被顛覆，但邊際分散趨勢存在且可量化：IMF COFER數據顯示，2025年相關季度中美元在已分配外匯儲備中的佔比降至56.32%（並伴隨匯率因素解釋） (data.imf.org)；美聯儲關於美元國際角色的研究也指出，美元在全球官方外匯儲備中的佔比在更長周期里較2001年的高點（約72%）已有回落，但仍顯著高於其他貨幣 (聯邦儲備委員會)。

　　與「貨幣份額緩慢變化」相對應的，是「避險與中性資產」的再配置——黃金成為更直觀的抓手。世界黃金協會在《2025年四季度及全年黃金需求趨勢》中披露，2025年各國央行淨購金約863噸，雖較前幾年峰值節奏有所放緩，但仍處於歷史高位區間 (World Gold Council)。當越來越多的官方部門傾向以黃金作為「非主權信用、非制裁鏈條」的配置補充時，市場對「單一體系資產」的依賴度就會出現結構性鬆動——這與達里奧的「秩序再平衡」敘事形成可驗證的呼應。

　　四、碎片化正在把「風險溢價」寫進價格：貿易、關稅與政策不確定性抬升資本成本

　　如果說債務是「存量壓力」，那麼地緣與貿易碎片化則更像「增量擾動」。國際清算銀行（BIS）在年度經濟報告中多次提示：若更高關稅與貿易壁壘固化，全球經濟沿地緣線碎片化，金融市場與宏觀穩定將面對更高的不確定性與波動 (國際清算銀行)。WTO對貿易前景的更新亦顯示，在關稅與政策不確定性加大的背景下，全球貿易增速預期被下調，2026年商品貿易量增速預測一度下修至約0.5% (wto.org)。

　　對資產定價而言，碎片化往往通過三條渠道傳導：

　　1）供應鏈冗餘帶來成本上升；2）關稅與合規摩擦壓縮利潤；3）風險溢價抬升融資成本與資本回報要求。換言之，達里奧所謂「更像1930年代的衝突結構」（貿易戰、科技戰、資本戰等）之所以值得警惕，並非歷史類比本身，而是這些機制確實會系統性改變現金流折現率與跨境資本配置偏好。

　　五、對亞太與中國企業出海的三點啟示：把宏觀敘事落到「財務與運營動作」

　　其一，融資要更「多通道+多幣種+期限管理」。當無風險利率中樞與期限溢價更易波動時，單一幣種與單一市場融資會放大再融資風險。企業更需要把債務結構做成「可滾動、可替換、可對沖」。

　　其二，匯率與結算不必押注單一方向，但要建立「成本可控」的對沖紀律。美元仍是主導結算與儲備貨幣，但儲備結構邊際變化與黃金配置上升說明：市場在為「尾部風險」付費 (data.imf.org)。對出海企業而言，目標不是預測匯率，而是把匯率波動從「利潤表衝擊」變成「預算內波動」。

　　其三，把碎片化視作「合規與交付能力」的競爭，而非單純關稅成本。貿易體系改革與摩擦加劇已成為現實議題 (Reuters)。誰能更快完成供應鏈本地化、數據與合規體系前置、以及多區域運營的「可複製模板」，誰就更可能在不確定中獲得訂單與融資的確定性。

　　六、風險與前景：警惕把「危機敘事」當作單變量

　　需要強調的是：儲備貨幣份額的下降是漸進的，美元體系的韌性仍強 (聯邦儲備委員會)；同時，海外資金仍在持續配置美債，主要持有國的規模也可從美國財政部TIC數據中觀察到（例如日本在2025年11月持有規模約1.20萬億美元） (U.S. Department of the Treasury)。因此，市場更可能呈現的不是「瞬時坍塌」，而是「高波動+高分化+高風險溢價」的新常態：對現金流穩定、資產負債表穩健、具備區域化交付能力的主體更友好，對依賴低利率與單一市場融資的主體更苛刻。

　　結語：在大周期里，最稀缺的不是觀點，而是「可執行的確定性」

　　達里奧的價值不在於給出某個時間點的預測，而在於提供一套把債務、政治與地緣聯動起來的觀察框架 。對企業與投資者而言，真正可控的動作始終是：優化負債結構、降低單一幣種暴露、用合規與交付能力對沖碎片化成本，並把宏觀不確定性轉化為資產與業務組合的「抗衝擊設計」。（作者：羅柳斌、隋源）

　　Tide Outlook ——Debt “Supply–Demand Imbalance” and Order Rebalancing

　　Lead : In recent months, Bridgewater founder Ray Dalio has repeatedly warned about U.S. debt dynamics. His central point is that debt supply is becoming too large while market demand may not absorb it smoothly, which could trigger a series of non-conventional policy and market reactions. His analysis goes beyond fiscal arithmetic. By placing the debt cycle alongside domestic political cycles and geopolitical cycles, he is effectively asking why the inertia of the old order is weakening.

　　I. Dalio’s Core Judgment

　　Do not look at debt alone, look at the overlap of “three big cycles”

　　In his framework on “how countries run into debt trouble,” Dalio repeatedly stresses the need to understand the Overall Big Cycle. It is driven by the Big Debt Cycle and interacts with a cycle of domestic political order change and a geopolitical cycle that reshapes the world order. This means his concern about U.S. debt is, on the surface, about fiscal balances and interest rates. At a deeper level, it is about a structural shift: when internal polarization and external competition rise at the same time, funding costs and capital preferences can migrate. The constraint for both states and firms becomes not only whether money can be borrowed, but also at what price and on what terms.

　　II. Data Reinforces the “Supply–Demand Narrative”

　　Deficit trajectory and interest burden bring funding pressure to the front

　　From measurable indicators, the U.S. fiscal hard constraint is being written more clearly into official projections. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office, in its latest Budget and Economic Outlook (2026–2036), estimates that the FY2026 federal deficit will be about USD 1.9 trillion, that public debt as a share of GDP will continue to climb over the next decade and reach around 120% by 2036, and that net interest outlays as a share of GDP are also projected to rise further. Under a scenario where interest costs increasingly crowd out fiscal space, the scale of new issuance and maturity choices will continue to influence the global risk-free rate anchor.

　　A more direct supply-side signal comes from financing arrangements. In its quarterly financing estimates, the U.S. Treasury indicated that for the January–March 2026 quarter alone, it expects to borrow about USD 574 billion in privately held net marketable debt. When supply stays structurally high while some buyers become more cautious—due to central-bank balance-sheet contraction or shifts in overseas risk appetite—Dalio’s “supply–demand imbalance” becomes more than an opinion. It becomes a mechanism the market can monitor continuously.

　　Dalio has highlighted this tension in public interviews as well: the U.S. needs to sell a large amount of Treasuries, but there is uncertainty over whether investors will absorb that supply at prevailing prices and yields. If the imbalance deepens, he worries about potentially “shocking” responses or outcomes.

　　III. “De-Dollarization” Looks More Like Marginal Reallocation

　　The dollar remains dominant, but diversification is underway

　　Debt supply and demand cannot be separated from a key question: will dollar assets continue to be absorbed without conditions. In the reserve-currency structure, the dollar’s position has not been overturned. But marginal diversification is visible and measurable. IMF COFER data show that in a relevant 2025 quarter, the dollar’s share of allocated global FX reserves fell to 56.32%, with the IMF also noting the role of exchange-rate effects in interpreting these shares. Federal Reserve research on the international role of the dollar similarly observes that the dollar’s share of official reserves has declined from its longer-run high—around 72% in 2001—yet still remains well above other currencies.

　　Matching this slow shift in currency shares is a reallocation toward safe-haven and neutral assets, with gold as the more intuitive indicator. The World Gold Council, in its Gold Demand Trends for Q4 and Full Year 2025, reported that central banks bought a net about 863 tonnes of gold in 2025. Although this pace was slower than the peaks of prior years, it still sits within a historically elevated range. As more official holders treat gold as a complement that sits outside sovereign credit and sanctions chains, reliance on any single system can loosen at the margin. This provides a verifiable parallel to Dalio’s “order rebalancing” narrative.

　　IV. Fragmentation Is Pricing In Risk Premia

　　Trade, tariffs, and policy uncertainty raise the cost of capital

　　If debt is a stock pressure, then geopolitical and trade fragmentation is more of a flow disturbance. The Bank for International Settlements has repeatedly warned in its annual reports that if higher tariffs and trade barriers become entrenched, the global economy could fragment along geopolitical lines, raising uncertainty and volatility for both markets and macro stability. WTO updates on the trade outlook also suggest that amid higher tariff risks and policy uncertainty, global trade growth expectations have been marked down, with the projected 2026 merchandise trade volume growth once revised down to around 0.5%.

　　For asset pricing, fragmentation typically transmits through three channels

　　1 supply-chain redundancy pushes costs higher

　　2 tariffs and compliance frictions compress margins

　　3 higher risk premia lift funding costs and required returns

　　In other words, Dalio’s warning that the environment may resemble a “1930s-style conflict structure”—trade wars, technology wars, capital wars—is not persuasive because of the analogy itself. It matters because these mechanisms can systematically change discount rates and cross-border capital preferences.

　　V. Three Implications for Asia-Pacific and Chinese Companies Going Global

　　Turn macro narratives into finance and operations actions

　　First, financing should shift toward multi-channel, multi-currency, and maturity management. When the risk-free anchor and term premia become more volatile, reliance on a single currency or a single market amplifies refinancing risk. Companies need debt structures that can be rolled, replaced, and hedged.

　　Second, do not bet on one FX direction. Build a hedging discipline with controllable costs. The dollar still dominates settlement and reserves. But marginal changes in reserve composition and rising official gold allocations imply markets are paying for tail risk. For globalizing firms, the aim is not to forecast exchange rates, but to convert FX volatility from an income-statement shock into budgeted variability.

　　Third, treat fragmentation as competition in compliance and delivery capability, not merely tariff cost. Trade-system reform and rising frictions have become practical realities. Whoever can move faster on supply-chain localization, front-load data and compliance systems, and build replicable multi-region operating templates is more likely to secure order certainty and funding certainty in an uncertain environment.

　　VI. Risks and Outlook

　　Avoid treating the “crisis narrative” as a single variable

　　Two points deserve emphasis. First, reserve-currency shares generally change gradually, and the dollar system remains resilient. Second, overseas demand for Treasuries continues, and the scale of major holders can be tracked in U.S. Treasury TIC data—for example, Japan’s holdings in November 2025 were about USD 1.20 trillion. Therefore, the more likely market regime is not a sudden collapse, but a new normal of higher volatility, sharper differentiation, and higher risk premia. Entities with stable cash flows, strong balance sheets, and regional delivery capability will be rewarded. Those dependent on low rates and single-market funding will face a harsher environment.

　　Conclusion

　　In a big cycle, the scarce asset is not opinions, but executable certainty

　　Dalio’s value is not in pinpointing timing, but in offering a framework that links debt, politics, and geopolitics into one coherent observation system. For companies and investors, the controllable actions remain consistent: optimize liability structures, reduce single-currency exposure, hedge fragmentation through compliance and delivery capability, and convert macro uncertainty into resilience design at the portfolio and operating-model level.

　　Authors: Liubin Luo 、Nebula Sui