終審法院早前裁定，要男囚犯剪短頭髮的規定是直接構成性別歧視，前常任法官烈顯倫撰文，認為法院裁決「離地」，又質疑他們盲目追捧海外案例，似乎不關心裁決對監獄紀律的影響。司法機構指不評論個別事件。
立法會前議員梁國雄就男囚犯剪短頭髮的規定申請司法覆核，並上訴至終審法院。終院指懲教署署長無法解釋男女囚犯之間為何有不同待遇，又指男囚犯頭髮要「盡量剪短」的常規令違反《性別歧視條例》，最終一致裁定梁國雄勝訴。
終審法院前常任法官烈顯倫回應這次裁決，以「法官是否管理監獄？」為題撰文，認為男性監獄相關規則在女性監獄並不適用，反之亦然，《性別歧視條例》未能套用於今次案件。
他認同懲教署一方指，男士長髮不屬於傳統髮型，而男性監獄要求統一髮型是不想強調個人風格，與監獄紀律相符都是常識，批評法院似乎「離地」、只顧咬文嚼字。
對於終審法院首席法官指，允許女囚犯入獄時可保留髮型，包括長髮；而男性則不可以，屬「較差待遇」。烈顯倫反駁指，女囚犯亦有限制，若醫生要求她剪頭髮，她亦須遵從。
烈顯倫又指，法庭認為如果不引用《性別歧視條例》，而是引用《基本法》第25條中「香港居民在法律面前一律平等」來審理，裁決結果都是一樣，是將地區問題提升至國家層面，無疑是邀請律師肆意踐踏《基本法》，毫不考慮後果。
烈顯倫指終審法院裁決的影響，無疑是要放寬男性監獄對囚犯髮型的限制，終審法院似乎不太關心裁決對監獄紀律的影響；又指梁國雄服刑後才提出申請，那時候可能頭髮也長了，質疑他是否出於善意，以及是否有甚麼目的，而法院裁定廢除髮型規定是否有助男性監獄管理。
他認為三個級別法院的法官只繞著海外判例打轉，漠視《普通法》在「一國兩制」的原則下運作的事實。長遠而言，抱持這種心態百害而無一利。
全文如下：
終審法院前常任法官列顯倫撰文 (中譯版)
監獄由法官管理嗎？
【事件】
在香港，有男性監獄、女性監獄，不設男女混合監獄，所以各監獄的紀律制度自然有所不同。
【紀律規則】
有關男囚犯髮型的規定，《監獄規則》指出：
「為保健康及清潔，所有已定罪男性囚犯的頭髮須盡量剪短，但不用剪陸軍裝，除非囚犯本身要求如此。」
而女囚犯的髮型要求則不同，規則如下：
「若女子囚犯申請剪髮，須為其作出安排，特別是在獲釋前或到法庭應訊前。未經囚犯同意，不可把其頭髮剪至較進入院所時的髮型更短。但如醫生建議這樣做，則屬例外。」
以上兩項規則同在常規令41-05中列明。
不過，它們顯然有很大差別。
另一項《監獄規則》要求總懲教主任須確保男囚犯衣服修補妥善，「頭髮經常修剪，囚犯的洗滌、束髮及潔淨事宜亦獲得照管。」
《監獄規則》第34條亦提及所有囚犯的一般待遇，「每名囚犯均須服從就洗滌、洗澡、剃鬚及剪髮事宜而不時訂明的指示。」
【長毛案】
2012年3月，梁國雄(又稱「長毛」)就數項刑事罪行被定罪。2014年6月，他上訴後被判囚四星期，在荔枝角收押所服刑。他在進入收押所時反對剪短頭髮，又稱或會就有關規定提出司法覆核。在確定其未有提出申請後，總懲教主任指示為其剪髮。
梁國雄之後就展開司法覆核程序申請許可，相關案件列為「梁國雄(又稱「長毛」)訴懲教署署長」(案件編號HCAL 109/2014)，由法官區慶祥於2015年4至5月間審理。
法官在一年半後，頒下39頁判決書，作出以下判決：
‧聲明有關男囚犯的規則，「構成直接性別歧視，違反《性別歧視條例》第5(1)(a)條，從而根據該條例第38(1)條屬於違法；或」
‧頒令撤銷總懲教主任執行規則的決定
【法定罪行】
有關性別歧視的罪行屬法規產物，《普通法》沒有提及此罪。
二戰前，英格蘭法庭上沒有女法官，《普通法》沒有糾正性別歧視。不是法官，而是一眾立法議員，逐步意識到這是個道德問題。
隨之而來，在法規中找到構成這種違法行為的元素。
1996年5月，香港制定《性別歧視條例》。
其標題寫明，這是一條將特定種類性別歧視定為違法的法令。
並列出各種不同類型的歧視，例如：
‧第9條：使人受害的歧視
‧第13條：僱主對合約工作者的歧視
‧第36條：大律師相關的歧視
‧第38(1)條：政府作出的歧視
【第5(1)(a)條】
法官認為，有關獄中男子髮型的規則，屬他所稱的「直接歧視」，如第5(1)(a)條的定義。
再綜合第6條及第38(1)條，指出：
「署長基於一名男性的性別，給予他的待遇，比起給予女性為差，就本條例任何條文而言在有關的情況下，屬歧視該男性。」
留意字眼「就本條例任何條文而言在有關的情況下」。
此案的法定「目的」是禁止第38(1)條所指的情況，故政府在行使職能時歧視梁國雄屬違法。
但實際情況又如何？
他們都是在男性監獄。
顯然，男性監獄相關的規則，在女性監獄並不適用，反之亦然。
以判斷第5(1)(a)條是否適用於涉及男囚犯的案件，與女性監獄的情況比較並不合適。
若對此有疑問，第10條可將之消除，條文規定：
「跟據第5(1)條比較不同性別的人的個案......只可將有關情況相同或無重大分別的個案相比較。」
任何沒學過法律的普通人，都會發現這是常識，在生活中，沒有淩駕實際情況的道德框架，道德價值不會獨立存在。當有說人：「這是性別歧視」，這項陳述並無意思，除非你了解實際情況。
而《性別歧視條例》在此案不適用。
【法官如何得出裁決】
法官定出三種歧視：直接歧視、間接歧視及「特利蒙諾斯歧視」，這是海外判例的用語，其中「Thlimminos discrimination」，是以歐洲人權法院裁定的同名案件命名。
「直接歧視」指的是第5(1)(a)條的歧視種類。
區慶祥法官沒有專注香港法規的措詞， 而是完全纏糾於涉及「直接歧視」的海外判例， 仿佛那是從法定根源分出來的通用術語，他從未聚焦於第5(1)(a)的用詞。
在區慶祥法官前，法官與律師就各個案件逐一拆解、討論，例如判詞第56段提到：
「因此Gillan案不支持包先生，對Roma案的正確性提出質疑。」
包先生是署長的代表律師，而就這兩宗案件的持續對話始於判決書第44段，當中闡述了Roma案的案情。該案涉及移民局在布拉格機場對想進入英國的人士實施出入境管制；Gillan案則涉及警方在英國的截查能力，但這些案件對香港性別歧視的法規有甚麼含義，並沒有解釋。
在第56段就這兩案得出結論後，可以見到多個段落，涉及討論其他國家案例，以第98段作結：
「基於上述所有原因，我拒絕署長的論點並作出結論， SO 41-05及有關決定，等同直接性別歧視，所以屬違法。」
而「上述原因」已在20頁紙列出，很少人會明白內容，不論其英語水平有多高。
【普通人觀點】
對普通公民而言，海外判例法完全是一個謎。
不過若只將焦點放在「就本條例任何條文而言在有關的情況下」，那樣就符合普通人處理此事的方式，歧視問題應就適當背景討論，也就是說，男性監獄的監獄紀律。
普通人會稱：「為甚麼大驚小怪？ 你是說女性規則要應用在男性監獄？」他可能會加一句：「現在監獄要由法官管理嗎？」
此外，一般人不會為「男囚犯待遇比女囚犯為差」而煩惱。他們會意識到這是監獄紀律之一，屬署長的職責。囚犯一致遵從規則，是懲教過程的重要部分，這與是否女性囚犯無關。
以這種方式審理的話，判詞不會超過幾頁紙，亦容易被普羅大眾理解。
【《基本法》第25條】
有關監獄要求的髮型是否違反《基本法》第25條，普通人不會完全信服法官的結論。
《基本法》第25條列明：「香港居民在法律面前一律平等」。
在「一國兩制」原則下，應用《基本法》第25條於這種案件，令人驚訝。
《基本法》是憲法文件，是特區的整體框架，而非規範香港日常事務的民法典，當然不會用以規範監獄管理。
【上訴法庭】
署長提出上訴，上訴法庭在2018年4月作出裁決。首席法官沒有作出主要判決，這留給了林文瀚副庭長。但首席法官定下基調，他開始時說：
「歧視是一個重大議題，衍生大量文獻和辯論，它跨越很多學科，法律只是其一。」
循此方向，無可避免的就是，普通人完全無法理解冗長的判詞。
實際上，上訴法院在審理很多類似案件後，得出相反結論。區慶祥法官在兩方面犯錯，也就是說，就案情採用第5(1)(a)條，以及依賴《基本法》第25條。
區慶祥法官的裁決被推翻。
【終審法院】
梁國雄再提出上訴。
終審法院在10月審理，11月27日裁決，震驚整個社區。它推翻上訴法庭的裁決，恢復區慶祥法官的裁決。首席法官作出判決，餘下四名法官同意。
他作出判決時提到，有關European Roma Rights v The Prague Immigration Office (2005)案件，何熙怡女男爵的四步法言論很有幫助。
這立即引起一個問題：如何「有幫助」？難道第5(1)(a)條文的字眼不夠清楚嗎？無論如何，以下是四步法的解釋。
【四步法】
15(1) 不論在真實或假設的情況下，原告人與被比較者屬不同性別，兩者的待遇必須有差異。
(2) 原告人與被比較者的相關情況要相同，或至少沒實質分別。
(3) 必須證明原告人的待遇，不及被比較者的待遇。
(4) 待遇分別是基於性別。
關於第15(1)條，首席法官指：「男囚犯在髮型方面的選擇不及女囚犯」，這點是正確的。
【有關情況】
關於第15(2)條，首席法官稱：「重要的是在同類事件作比較，並在適當環境下審視。」這點也正確。外界就期望相關判決會審視當中的問題：「甚麼叫適當環境？法庭要求比較同類情況嗎？」
但沒有，判決立即轉到第15(3)條：「甚麼是較差待遇？」
【較差待遇】
之後有11頁文本，涉及各種海外判例：關於中學選拔的「Birmingham City Council v Equal Opportunities Commission案」；有關學生頭髮長度的Re McMillan案」；有關監獄進行全身搜查的「James Dowell v Secretary of State for Justice案」及「Conway v Canada案」；關於超市穿著要求的「Smith v Safeway案」；還有在書店要有整潔外觀，作商務打扮的「Department for Works and Pension v Thompson案」。
這11頁紙都列入「較差待遇」條目之下。
某人獲平等對待，或「較差待遇」，只能就實際案情審視。這可不是甚麼綜合練習。引用一百個案例來處理不同的情況，不會得出答案。
再說，「平等」、「較差待遇」是難以理解的概念。
署長代表提出的一個論點是，要求梁國雄剪的髮型，只不過是香港大多數男士的傳統髮型。這要求在男性監獄統一使用，不強調個人風格，與監獄紀律相符合。這都是常識。
但首席法官認為監獄紀律是有需要的之外，卻令人驚訝地在第52段提及：
「…沒有資料，也沒有根據能說明，我們社會的男性傳統髮型是短髮，而女性的髮型則可長可短。必須有足夠理據證明這些事，不可單憑純粹聲稱...」
可悲的是，法院似乎只顧咬文嚼字，非常「離地」。
終審法院首席法官認為，「較差待遇」基於一個事實，就是允許女囚犯入獄時可保留髮型，包括長髮；而男性就不可以。但實情是，首席法官並不完全正確。女性亦面對一些限制。她的選擇並非完全不受限制，如醫生要她剪頭髮，根據《監獄規則》，她亦要遵從。
在兩個較下級法院，法官透過檢視情況不相同的案件，審視「較差待遇」的概念，並得出相反結論。
這一概念如此難界定，原因是忽略了案件中一樣重要的事實。
署長是這司法覆核程序的應訴人。
若有人問他：「這案件是甚麼回事？」他肯定會回答：「這關於男性監獄的監獄紀律。」
在這情況下，關於「較差待遇」的問題就消失了，跟女性的規則比較並不合適。
【《基本法》第25條】
在判詞第56段提到：
「由於第一條問題判上訴得直，因此無須處理這條問題。就本案的事實而言，上訴人基於《基本法》第二十五條所提出的申請，其結果也將一樣。」
這看來是「魔鬼在細節」。
首席法官的意思是，就有關監獄規則的挑戰，如果不是引用《性別歧視條例》，而是引用《基本法》第25條來審理，結果都是一樣的。
換句話說，他認為《基本法》第25條適用於廢除監獄規則：將地區問題提升至國家層面。這無疑是在邀請律師肆意踐踏《基本法》，毫不考慮後果。
【透明度】
面對對司法機構的批評，首席法官在9月23日發表了一篇聲明，當中第29段提到：
「社會大眾可藉下述方法自己觀察及確認法院是否依循了基本原則︰他們可旁聽法庭程序……以及閱讀各級法院的判案書以確切地了解法庭作出某個裁定的理由爲何……司法公開及透明使社會大眾可全面觀察司法程序的進行，並作出有意義及有理可據的評論、意見或批評。」
可是，這判決一點也不透明。
它透過當地規程將一個道德問題視為罪行。就這種問題的判決，受過教育的人理應都能理解。不過，此判決及較下級法院都只著眼「法規」，不論大眾英語水平如何，也無法理解。
【法院權力的限制】
就這樣的案件，主要關於男性監獄的管理，法院處理此事應抱猶豫和審慎的態度。署長具備法官們沒有的專業知識，獄中的行為標準都由署長制定。這些標準涉及範圍廣泛，若法官期望社會，尊重他們制定的規範及價值觀，他們反過來必須尊重由其他機構所定的標準。法官不能壟斷社會上的道德標準。
【這裁決得到甚麼？】
終審法院裁決所產生的影響，無疑是必須放寬男性監獄對囚犯髮型的限制。這或會引起連鎖反應。這會對監獄紀律造成甚麼後續影響，終審法院就似乎不太關心。
當初區慶祥法官要處理的，僅是申請司法覆核程序的許可，區慶祥法官應擔當好把關者的角色。司法覆核是為了依法施政，良好管治而來，但歸根究底是斟情措施。
梁國雄是在服刑完畢後才提出申請，那時候可能連頭髮也長了。他是出於善意嗎？他有甚麼目的？
法院裁定廢除髮型規定，有助男性監獄的管理嗎？
【領導角色？】
若果終審法院意識到其在社會擔當的領導角色，那就會關心這些問題。但法庭未有就案件程序方面多作思考，只是在迎合律師定下的議程。
【以歐洲為中心的觀念】
也許更令人憂慮的是，裁決傾向以歐洲為中心，而不是根據當地法規的一般意義作出裁決。法院以粗野直接的方式，將相關措詞應用在案件中，模糊法律原則。
三個級別的法院法官只繞著海外判例打轉，漠視普通法在「一國兩制」的原則下運作的事實。長遠來說，抱持這種心態百害而無一利。
這亦不是普通法延續下去的方法。
DO JUDGES RUN PRISONS ?
The Scenario
In Hong Kong there are male prisons, and there are female prisons. There are no mixed prisons. The disciplinary regime in each is different, for obvious reasons.
The Disciplinary Rules
As regards hair style, this is what the Prison Rule says about male prisoners:
"The hair of all male convicted prisoners will be kept cut sufficiently close, but not close cropped, for the purpose of health and cleanliness, unless the prisoner himself requests it".
But for female prisoners it is different. The rule says:
"Upon request, female prisoners will have their hair cut especially before discharge or production in court. Except as recommended by MO [Medical Officer] a female prisoner' s hair shall not be cut shorter than the style on admission without her consent."
These two rules are set out in the Standing Orders for prisons, but grouped together in SO 41-05.
However presented, they are clearly different rules.
Another Prison Rule requires the Chief Officer to ensure that male prisoners' clothing is kept in a good state of repair, and "their hair kept trimmed, and their washing, hair clipping and personal ablution attended to".
Then Prison Rule 34, regarding general treatment of all prisoners, says:
"Every prisoner shall obey such directions as regards washing, bathing, shaving and hair cutting as may from time to time be prescribed".
The "Long Hair" case
In March 2012 Leung Kwok Hung (also known as "Long Hair") was convicted before a magistrate of criminal charges. In June 2014, after an appeal, he was required to serve a sentence of four-weeks imprisonment. This he did at the Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre. On admission he objected to having his hair cut short, and said he might apply for judicial review to challenge such requirement. After ascertaining that no application had been made, the Chief Officer authorized the hair-cutting to proceed. That was done.
Leung subsequently did apply for leave to start judicial review proceedings: Hence the case Leung Kwok Hung aka "Long Hair" v Commissioner for Correctional Services [HCAL 109/2014] heard by Au J in April and May 2015.
In a 39-page judgment handed down 1 ½ years later, he made the following orders:
‧A declaration that the rule for male prisoners constituted "direct sex discrimination under s.5 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and was made unlawful under s.38(1) of the Ordinance; or alternatively the rule violated Article 25 of the Basic Law and was unlawful".
‧An order to quash the Chief Officer's decision to enforce the rule.
Statutory Offence
The offence of sex discrimination is a pure creature of statute. The common law knew nothing of such offence.Before WWII, there was not a single female judge on the Bench anywhere in England. The common law gave no redress for sex discrimination. It was not the common law judges but legislators who, bit by bit, came to realize that this was an ethical issue.
It follows, as night follows day, that the ingredients of such offence are to be found in the statute itself. Nowhere else.
The Hong Kong Sex Discrimination Ordinance was first enacted in May 1996.
Its long title says that it is an Ordinance to render unlawful "certain kinds of sex discrimination ….".
There then follows many different kinds of discrimination. For example:
‧Discrimination by way of victimization: s. 9
‧Discrimination by employers against contract workers: s. 13
‧Discrimination by barristers: s. 36.
‧Governmental discrimination: s.38(1).
Section 5(1)(a)
Here, the judge held that the rule concerning male hair-style in prison was what he called “direct discrimination”, as defined in s.5(1)(a).
That section, taken together with s. 6 and s.38(1) reads thus:
"The Commissioner discriminates against a man in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Ordinance if, on the ground of his sex, he treats him less favourably than he treats a woman".
Note the words: "in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Ordinance".
The statutory "purpose" in this case is the prohibition in s.38(1) which makes it unlawful for the government, in the exercise of its functions, to discriminate against Leung Kwok Hung.
But what were the relevant circumstances ?
They were those in a male prison.
The prison regime relevant in a male prison does not apply in a female prison, for obvious reasons. And vice-versa.
In judging whether s.5(1)(a) is engaged in a case concerning male prisoners, comparison with circumstances in a female prison is not relevant.
If there be any doubt about this, it would be dispelled by s.10 which says:
"A comparison of the cases of different sex under s. 5(1) ….shall be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other."
Any ordinary person, not learned in the law, would have found this a matter of plain common sense. In life, there is no ethical framework that transcends context. Ethical values are not free-standing. When someone says: "This is sex discrimination", that statement has no meaning unless you know the context in which it is said.
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance was simply not engaged in this case. End of story.
How Did the Judge Get To The Result He Did ?
The judge identified "three types of discrimination": Direct, indirect and Thlimmenos discrimination. These are labels used in overseas case law. The term Thlimminos discrimination came from a case of that name decided in the European Court of Human Rights.
The expression "direct discrimination" identified the kind of discrimination set out in s. 5(1)(a).
Au J, instead of focussing on the words in the Hong Kong statute, got totally entangled in overseas case law concerning "direct discrimination", as if this was a generic term detached from its statutory roots. He never focussed on the simple words in s.5(1)(a).
Before Au J, the exercise in court seemed like a running dialogue between Bench and Bar, with case after case being dissected and discussed.
For instance in para. 56 of his judgment one finds this sentence:
"The Gillan Case therefore does not support Mr Pao’s submissions questioning the correctness of the Roma Case."
Mr Pao was counsel for the Commissioner. The running dialogue on these two cases began in para.44 of the judgment where the facts of the Roma Case were set out. They involved immigration control at the Prague airport for those seeking entry into the UK. The Gillan Case concerned police powers of stop and search in the UK. How these cases elucidated the meaning of the Hong Kong statute on sex discrimination was not explained.
After the conclusion on those two cases reached in para 56, one sees many more paragraphs in the judgment where other overseas cases were discussed, ending with para 98:
"For all the above reasons, I reject the Commissioner’s arguments and conclude that SO 41-05 and the Decision amount to direct sex discrimination and are thus unlawful".
The "above reasons" were set out in about 20 pages of fine print. Few can understand them, however elevated their level of English.
The Common Man's Perspective
Overseas case law would be a complete mystery to the ordinary citizen.
But if one simply focussed attention on the words "circumstances relevant for the purposes ….of this Ordinance", that would have coincided with the way an ordinary person would have approached the matter. The question of discrimination would have been put in the right context: That is to say, custodial discipline in a male prison.
The common man would have said: "what is the fuss all about ? Are you saying that the female rules should apply in a male prison ?" And he might even have added: "Are the judges now going to run prisons as well ?"
Furthermore, the ordinary person would not have agonized over whether, under the rules, a male inmate was being treated "less favourably" than a female inmate.He would have realized that the matter was one of custodial discipline, within the Commissioner's responsibilities ; uniformity and conformity among inmates was important as part of the correctional process. But females were not the inmates under consideration.
Adopting such an approach the judgment would not have been more than a couple of pages long, and would have been easily understood by the ordinary citizen.
Article 25 Basic Law
As regards whether the rule concerning prison hair-style offended Article 25 of the Basic Law, the ordinary man would have shaken his head in total disbelief at the judge's conclusion.
Article 25 simply says:"All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law". Full stop.
The notion that, under the principle of One Country Two Systems, Article 25 of the Basic Law could be engaged in a case like this is alarming.
The Basic Law is a constitutional document, setting out the general framework for the Region. It is not a civil code for regulating Hong Kong's daily affairs: And certainly not for regulating the way prisons should be run.
The Court of Appeal
The Commissioner appealed. The Court of Appeal gave judgment in April 2018.The Chief Judge did not write the leading judgment. This was left to Lam VP. But the Chief Judge did set the tone. He began his judgment by saying:
"Discrimination is a huge subject that has generated a tremendous amount of literature and debate. It straddles many disciplines and law is just one of them."
With such an approach it was inevitable that the judgments amounted to pages and pages of fine print, totally unintelligible to the ordinary person.
As it was, the Court of Appeal, after tripping through many of the same cases as the judge, came to the opposite conclusion: that Au J had erred on both counts: that is to say, the application of s.5(1)(a) to the facts of the case, and his reliance on Article 25 of the Basic Law.
Au J's judgment was quashed.
Court of Final Appeal
Leung Kwok Hung in turn lodged an appeal.
This was heard by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in October. Its judgment handed down on 27 November 2020 must have shocked the community. It overturned the Court of Appeal's judgment. Au J's judgment was restored.The Chief Justice delivered the only judgment, with which the other four judges agreed.
He began his judgment by saying that a "4-step approach contained in the speech of Baroness Hale of Richmond in R (European Roma Rights v The Prague Immigration Office [2005 ] 2 AC 1 at para 73 is helpful".
That immediately raises the question: "Helpful" as to what ? Is the wording in s.5(1)(a) not clear enough ? At any rate, these are the 4-steps.
"4-Step Approach"
"15 (1) There must be a difference in treatment between one person ……and another person, real or hypothetical, from a different sex group, the compared person ( in our case, female prisoners ).
(2) The relevant circumstances between the complainant and the compared person are the same or at least not materially different.
(3) It must then be shown that the treatment given to the complainant is less favourable than that given to the compared person.
(4) The difference in treatment is on the basis of sex."
As to 15(1), the Chief Justice said that male prisoners did not "have the choice as regards hair-style that female prisoners had", which of course is right.
"The Relevant Circumstances"
As to 15(2), the Chief Justice said:
"…it is important to compare like with like and to view the matter in proper context". That again is correct, and one would have expected the judgment then to examine the question: What is the proper context ? Is the court being asked to compare like with like ?
But not at all. The judgment immediately moved on to 15(3): What constitutes "less favourable treatment".
"Less Favourable Treatment"
There then followed eleven pages of text examining a whole range of overseas cases dealing with a variety of situations: Selection requirements for secondary schools Birmingham City Council v Equal Opportunities Commission; length of hair in schools Re McMillan; rub down searches in prisons R (on the Application of James Dowell v Secretary of State for Justice and Conway v Canada; dress and appearance code in a supermarket Smith v Safeway; what constitutes presenting a clean and tidy appearance and to dress in a business-like way in a book shop Department for Works and Pensions v Thompson.
Those eleven pages were under the heading "Less favourable treatment".
Whether someone has been treated "equally" or "less favourably" can only be examined in the actual context of the case. It is not an abstract exercise. A hundred citations of cases dealing with different situations will yield no answer.
What is more, "equality", "less favourable treatment" are elusive concepts.
One argument put up on the Commissioner's behalf was this: the requirement imposed on Leung Kwok Hung was no more than the conventional hair-style of the majority of males in Hong Kong. That requirement was uniformly applied in a male prison: to de-emphasise individuality In the interests of custodial discipline. That is plain common sense.
But, whilst accepting the need for custodial discipline, the Chief Justice, astonishingly, said this in para 52:
"….no details are provided and no basis is given for saying that in our society, the conventional hairstyle for men is a short one whereas for women hair can be long or short. There must be sufficient evidence going to these matters; they cannot simply be asserted …." .
Sadly, the court appears to dwell in a world of words, detached from reality on the ground.
In the Chief Justice's view, the "less favourable treatment" rested on the fact that a female prisoner, on admission, was allowed to keep her hairstyle even if it was long, whereas a male could not. But factually, the Chief Justice was not entirely correct. The female was also under some limitation. Her choice was not unrestrained. If the Medical Office required her hair to be cut, then under the Prison Rules she had to comply.
In the two courts below, the judges looked at the concept of "less favourable treatment" through the lens of cases dealing with a diversity of situations and came to opposite conclusions.
The reason why it is so difficult to nail down that concept is because the context in which it was being considered was missing.
The Commissioner was the respondent to these judicial review proceedings.
Were he to be asked: "what is this case all about ?" his reply would surely have been "about custodial discipline in a male prison".
In this context, the problem of "less favourable treatment" disappears. The comparison with the female regime was simply not relevant.
Article 25 of the Basic Law
In para 56 the judgment said this:
"In view of the conclusion reached on the previous issue, it is unnecessary to deal with this issue. However, on the facts of the present case, the outcome would not be different under Article 25 of the Basic Law."
This seemingly throwaway line contains a most sinister seed.
What the Chief Justice was saying, in effect, was this: Were the challenge to the prison rule to be judged, not by applying the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, but by applying Article 25 of the Basic Law, the result would have been the same.
In other words, he would have interpreted Article 25 of the Basic Law as applicable to strike down the prison rule: raising, in effect, a purely local matter to the State level. This was an open invitation to lawyers to play games with the Basic Law, regardless of the consequences.
Transparency
The Chief Justice, in answer to general criticisms of the Judiciary, issued a statement on 23 September in which he said (para 29):
"The community is able to see for itself and verify whether fundamental principles are followed by the courts by observing court proceedings ………and reading the judgments of the courts at all levels to see precisely the reasons why a court has arrived at a determination …..Open justice and transparency enable the community to observe the judicial process in full, and to provide meaningful and informed comments and criticisms".
Unhappily, this judgment is anything but transparent.
It deals essentially with an ethical issue, made into an offence by a local statute. Any judgment on such an issue should be understood by every educated person. Yet this judgment, and those in the courts below, are so dense with "law" that no-one can possibly understand them, however elevated their standard of English.
Limits of Courts' Powers
In a case such as this, which essentially concerns management of male prisons, a court should approach the matter with hesitancy and diffidence. The Commissioner has expertise which judges do not share. The standards of behaviour are set by the Commissioner. Such standards fall naturally within a broad spectrum. If judges expect the community to respect the norms and values set by them, they in turn must show respect for those set by other institutions. Judges have no monopoly on ethical standards set in society.
What has this judgment achieved ?
The undoubted effect of the CFA's judgment is that discipline in male prisons must now be relaxed as regards hairstyle. There will be repercussions. What follow-on impact this might have on custodial discipline as a whole seems of no concern to the CFA.
What Au J had before him was a mere application for leave to start proceedings for judicial review. Au J was in the position of a gate-keeper. Judicial review is brought in the interests of lawful administration, good governance. It is, at the end of the day, a discretionary remedy.
The application was made some time after Leung had served his sentence. It might even be the case that his hair had grown back to its full length by that time. Was it made in good faith ? What interests of his did it serve ?
Did it help good administration in male prisons to have the hairstyle rule struck down by the court ?
A Leadership Role ?
Had the CFA been conscious of its leadership role in the community, these would have been matters of concern to the court.But the court gave the procedural aspects of the case not an ounce of thought. It simply played to the agenda laid down by counsel.
Eurocentric View
And what is perhaps even more troubling is the Eurocentric leaning of the judgments. Instead of giving the words in a local statute their plain ordinary meaning, and applying those words to the facts of the case in a robust straightforward way, the courts favoured the formulation of vague principles.
The judges, at all three levels of the courts, seem drawn to overseas case law as moths to naked light: apparently brushing aside the inconvenient truth that the common law system operates under the principle of One Country Two Systems. Such mindset spells disaster in the long run.
This is not a formula for the long continuation of the common law.
