Canberra has once more proved that it is the political coup capital of the democratic world. For the third time since 2010, the Prime Minister has changed not as a result of a public election but through an opponent within their own Party supplanting them. Prime Minister Rudd was felled by his then deputy Julia Gillard in 2010. Three years later, with falling approval ratings just before an election, Rudd affected his revenge, opposing his erstwhile nemesis, overthrowing her and standing as the Labour candidate in the 2013 election. He lost, his visible and sustained disloyalty punished by a repelled electorate, to be replaced by the Coalition leader Tony Abbott. But only two years into his term of office, on 14th September Abbott too was turfed out by the man he had replaced a few years earlier as leader of the Liberal party, Malcolm Turnball, because of tumbling public opinion ratings and a feeling within his party that he was a liability they could not afford to maintain loyalty to before elections that need to be held at the latest by next year.

　　What will this mean for policy towards China? The broad parameters of Australian foreign policy are unlikely to change. The relationship with the US will still loom large and dominate. China will figure in this as the core trading partner, but a complex relationship for Australia. But despite this inbuilt structural ambivalence, Turnball has a far more coherent view of the outside world than his predecessor. Unlike Abbott, he is much more committed to action on climate change. And while it is unlikely to make this a major issue, he does not share Abbott's firmly anglo-centric ideas. He is a republican, who believes in a much more Australia centric vision of the world, one in which his country's main challenge is to improve its competitiveness and economic positioning. And while he will still concentrate on security issues, his policy outlook is more comprehensive and complicated than the fixation his predecessor seemed to sometimes have on issues around ISIS and the Middle East.

　　Turnball knows the value of the relationship with China. His son is married to someone originally from China, even though they are now based in Singapore. While not particularly meaningful as a means of giving insights into his own thinking on China, it does show there is a connection with China beyond just casual political or economic links. He has visited China often, and on the whole the reception of his elevation has been reported on positively in the People's Republic. One report noted the warm words he said about China during the recent celebrations marking the seventieth anniversary since the end of the Second World War in Asia in early September. In them, he acknowledged the alliance of China with the UK, Australia, the US and the Soviet Union and the ways in which China stood at the front line of the fight against Japanese imperialism and the fascism of the Imperial Armies.

　　One immediate challenge that Turnball will face in the next few months (and he has promised not to hold an election until well into next year) is how to finally get the Free Trade Agreement agreed between China and Australia formally accepted by the Australian parliament and passed into law. Since the finalization of the deal, which has taken almost a decade, Labour opposition have mounted a vociferous campaign, arguing that the implementation of the Agreement will lead to Australia being flooded by cheap labour from China, the loss of jobs amongst locals, and rise in unemployment. At a time of falling GDP growth, with signs of slowing because of the intimate link to the Chinese economy and the knock on effect of the recent slow down there, these public fears, whether based in fact or not, are intensifying. Turnball cannot ignore them, but nor can he ignore the huge benefits the Agreement gives to Australia if implemented properly.

　　One of the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement is to grant Chinese investors coming to Australia the ability to apply for working visas for imported labour if they cannot find it domestically. But as officials have pointed out, the final right to make a decision about this lies with the government, and it does not impact on immigration policy or regulations which remain unchanged. Despite this, the Labour opposition, some unions and some media have claimed that this provision will see Chinese plumbers, construction workers and general labourers able to come to Australia, work for low wages and put locals out of jobs.

　　Turnball will need to take the lead in ensuring that the misapprehensions about the Agreement are dealt with. The bottom line, as his business background will tell him, is that after over a decade of addiction to selling commodities, and particularly iron ore, into the hungry Chinese market, fuelling solid growth even as the rest of the developed world was undergoing the global recession after 2008, the fat years are over. China's demand for commodities has dipped. It has just signed huge deals with iron ore suppliers in Brazil. Increasingly competition along with fall in demand has led to loss of jobs in the important mining sector, particularly in Western Australia, and a shortfall in government revenue of almost USD2 billion.

　　The Free Trade Agreement is the most visible of a number of measures by which Australia can reposition and retool its economic relations with China. It allows development of the services sector, using centres for finance like Sydney and Melbourne and the RMB trading deals they have to link more deeply with Chinese investors and companies seeking partnership and market abroad, for whom Australia has important potential. The greatest challenge here is that Australia has so far lacked a coherent narrative for its relations with China that reach beyond simply being a trade supplier and exporter to becoming an intellectual partner and using other aspects of its relationship.

　　While a man of independent wealth, and someone with great confidence, Turnball lacks the imperious personality of his predecessor Rudd, who also shared a similar interest in China. Turnball is not fluent in Mandarin Chinese like Rudd, but for a politician at this level that is not a disadvantage. Rudd's insistence on peppering his utterances in China with paraded Chinese phrases and slogans was too ostentatious to be effective, and he left no coherent body of ideas for his predecessors on China policy to help in reframing a more fit for purpose China policy. Turnball is pragmatic, and has more practical experience through business in dealing with China. So he is unlikely to be as narcissistic and fractious in his relations with the People's Republic as Rudd was. That is a good thing.

　　For all of these strengths, Turnball has the same issue as his three immediate predecessors. However successful his policy and viewpoint on China might be, this will not be the issue that will get him re-elected in his own right in 2016. For that, he needs to show the Australian public that he has a plan to protect their wages, their living standards, and their security. He is trying to do this at a very challenging time. Since the early nineties, Australia has never experienced a recession. This is an unprecedented record for a developed economy. But it also means that public ability to tighten their belts and put up with the sort of austerity politics that have characterized economies in Europe or North America is untested, and probably limited. Anger at the inward looking nature of the political elites in Australia, and their inability to get on with each other, is rising amongst the electorate. Turnball is faced with an opposition which while worthy and, at the moment, united, have failed to catch the public imagination. But his real challenge is amongst his own party.

　　It is here that the greatest threat lies. Turnball has always been seen as more liberal than many of his fellow party members. He supports same sex marriage, is a republican, and belongs more to the soft centre than the right wing of the Party. He is seen a vulnerable to those who say that he is actually a maverick in his own party. If he can produce electoral success, than his enemies will be silenced - at least for now. But if he is unable to get votes at the ballot box, Australia may well see another prime minister elected, the fifth in the space of a mere three years.

　　Professor Kerry Brown

　　Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney and Team Leader of the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) funded by the European Union. He is an Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London and author of `Struggling Giant: China in the 21st Century' (2007), `The Rise of the Dragon: Chinese Inward and Outward Investment in the Reform Era' (2008), `Friends and Enemies: The Past, Present and Future of the Communist Party of China' (2009), `Ballot Box China' (2011), `China 2020' (2011), `Hu Jintao: China's Silent Leader'(forthcoming).